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The Importance of Pluralism in Psychiatry (Βιοηθικοί Προβληματισμοί ΙΙ forthcoming 2016
Though pluralism is given a lot of lip service it is not the status quo in psychiatry. In this paper I argue that in following the recent Research Domain Criteria project (RDoC) of the National Institute of Mental Health, we run the danger of promoting a reductionist agenda that current evidence and research suggests is not the right way of tackling mental disorders. I further argue that in order to better address the needs of the patients and maintain the ethical standards required in the psychiatric profession we ought to maintain a pluralistic attitude in psychiatric research and practice.

An invited review of Andrew Steane's book, mostly focused on the question of the compatibility of science and religion.

A Frame of Mind From Psychiatry (Medicine, Healthcare and Philosophy 2015)
A distinctive characteristic of psychiatry is that it is a discipline that deals with both the physical and the mental lives of individuals. Largely because of this characteristic, different models are used for different disorders. However, there is still a remnant tendency towards reductionist views in the field. In this paper I argue that the available empirical evidence from psychiatry gives us reasons to question biological reductionism and that in its place we should adopt a pluralistic explanatory model that is more suited to the needs of the discipline and to the needs of the patients it is meant to help. This will allow us to retain psychiatry as an autonomous science that can productively co-exist with neuroscience while also giving patients the kind of attention they need. I further argue that this same evidence supports a view of the mind that is anti-reductive and that allows that causation can be both bottom-up and top-down and that such a view is available in emergentism coupled with an interventionist model of causation.
An invited review in which I very briefly put down some of my thoughts on religion, atheism and New Atheism.

Finding Directions by Indirection: The Island as a Blank Slate
(The Philosophy of J.J.Abrams 2014) 
A chapter in an edited collection of essays on the philosophy in/behind J.J.Abrams' work . Our piece is about the show Lost, its philosophical connections and their relation to the ground-breaking innovations that Lost introduced to the medium of television.

Emergence (Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2013)
A rather long entry on the concept of emergence and the history of emergentism.

Why a Naturalist should be an Emergentist about the Mind (Sats 2013)
Naturalism about the mind is typically associated with some kind of physicalism. This paper argues that this association is a mistake, and that given the naturalist’s commitment to the primacy of empirical evidence, naturalists should be open to different commitments. It is further argued that naturalists about the mind should be emergentists, because of the epistemological attitude that is at the core of the emergentist position, properly understood.

Review of Emergence in Mind edited by Cynthia Macdonald and Graham Macdonald (Philosophy 2012)
Review of an edited collection of high quality papers that were presented at a conference on emergence at Queen’s University at Belfast in 2007.

Hume, Fatima and Benedict the 16th (Cogito 2006)
In this non-academic essay published in Greek (Ο Hume, η Φατιμα και ο Βενεδiκτος 16ος) I discuss the miracle of Fatima in light of Hume's critique in On Miracles. I then suggest that Cardinal Ratzinger's (former Prefect of The Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, currently Pope Benedict XVI) definition of private revelations allows a good Catholic to not believe in this miracle (and many others).

Dennett's Dangerous Idea (Cogito 2005)
A non-academic essay in Greek (Η Επικίνδυνη Ιδέα του Dennett) in which I take up the question, posed by Dennett in the beginning of Darwin's Dangerous Idea, about the relation of science to philosophy and whether - and in what sense - there can be science without philosophy. 

Why Certainty is not a Mansion (Journal of Philosophical Research 2006)
In Certainty: A Refutation of Scepticism Peter Klein claims that, according to Wittgenstein, we attribute knowledge of a proposition p to a person only if that person is not certain of p. In this paper (that was part of my PhD dissertation) I address this claim and argue that a careful reading of Wittgenstein's On Certainty reveals that there are two kinds of objective certainty that Wittgenstein had in mind; propositional objective certainty and normative objective certainty. Klein fails to distinguish between the two and uses what I call propositional objective certainty to make his point against Wittgenstein. I contend that when Wittgenstein said that knowledge and certainty belong to different categories he was talking of normative objective certainty and, therefore, that Klein's criticism is misplaced and attributes to Wittgenstein a position that is not his.
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Elly Vintiadis,
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Lost.pdf
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